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The British Cotton Growing Association (BCGA) was
formed following the severe cotton shortage of the Lancashire looming
industries at the turn of the twentieth century (1901-1903).

Its purpose was to find new sources of cheap
cotton to replace the expensive and increasingly sparse productions from the
southern states of North America.

The newly colonised provinces of Northern Nigeria
promised to fulfill this role.

Hausa farmers had been growing cotton for
centuries. It would not be a problem to persuade them to expand production for
export. All that was needed to transform Kano into the Mecca of Lancashire. The
way through was to improve transport in between Kano and Lagos by expanding the
Nigerian railway project with a section linking Baro to Kano.

Members of the association argued that linking
Kano with the port of Lagos by rail would provide an endless supply of
affordable and good quality cotton for the looming industries of North Western
England. By persuading Hausa farmers to grow cotton for export, the BCGA would
be accomplishing it’s mission and saving one of the founding sectors of British
industrialisation.

Of course, obstacles to this project included the
four century-old textile manufactures, dying industries, and wide reaching
trading networks of Kano itself. Short looms were traditionally used to
manufacture the cotton and indigo produced in the region into high quality
turkedy and indigo dyed cloths. These were then traded across West Africa, the
Sahara, and North Africa, through a complex web of caravan routes and trading
networks.

The prices paid for cotton in Kano were often
twice as high as those paid in Lancashire. These figures demonstrate clearly
that local supply never satisfied the very high demand of the local
manufactures. However, British cotton enthusiasts, blinded by their agenda,
failed to evaluate the strength of the native industry.

By applying simple price comparison models they
imagined that they could overflow the northern market with cheaply produced
cloth from England to effectively ‘choke’ the Kanuwanci market. The Baro-Kano
railway extension was the effective means to transform the Manchester of West
Africa, as Kano was known, into a primary cotton exporter and an important
consumer of European textiles.

By March 1911 the tracks reached Kano, and on 1
April 1912, the railway opened for general traffic. In between, the BCGA
distributed free seeds of their preferred long-staple variety (Georgia variety)
and sent “junior native clerks” to train and buy cotton directly from
small-scale farmers. Their policy was to constantly offer a little more than
Hausa traders did to ensure they would get the product. However, the BCGA’s
dream turned into a nightmare when they realised that they had lost the
propaganda battle, a nightmare filled with mountains of groundnuts.

Whilst BCGA clerks were distributing free cotton
seeds, the Kola-nut trading families, Kambarin

Beriberi, Agalawa and Tokarawa, toured the region
promoting groundnuts by recruiting the services of village heads, offering
small gifts of salt and cloth and singing songs to the praise of groundnuts.
Farmers produced so many tons of these in the first season following the
arrival of the railway that the Kano rail station was ‘literally buried in
groundnuts’.

In December 1912, there were 3000 tons of
groundnuts stacked at the station awaiting shipment. By January 1913, only 674
tons had been shipped south, and more nuts were pouring into Kano. These were
not cleared until late April. The groundnut ‘boom’, as it is known, increased
in intensity in the planting season of 1913. Even the cattle Fulani are
remembered to have planted groundnuts to supplement their income!

On the other hand, not one batch of cotton is
recorded to have been shipped; no cotton at all!

Any increase in the region’s cotton production
following the BCGA’s efforts was therefore diverted to the manufactures of
Kano. Indeed, what turned out as a disaster for the BCGA and the colonial
government was an immense success for the economy of the northern regions.

Income generated by the groundnut boom further
boosted the manufacturing sector and set in motion externalities which
benefited all levels of the economy. The railway provided long distance traders
with access to European markets through the port of Lagos. Gandu farmers
supplemented their household income. Manufactures of all sorts expanded as
demand increased.

Ironically, Kano was able to import more cotton,
and reap the benefits of its centuries old ‘comparative advantage’ as West
Africa’s centre of trade and production.

In a nutshell, business oriented networks used
the dreams of the BCGA to their advantage. Colonial naïveté, coupled with an
important infrastructural investment, met the experience of kola traders, the
immense adaptability of Hausa farmers and the ‘vent for surplus’ of the
northern economies. Instead of cotton, the Lagos-Kano railway provided Europe
with endless supplies of groundnuts.

From the farmer’s perspective, there are four
main advantages to growing peanuts. First, ‘the groundnut has the most welcome
property of adding nitrogen to the soil, meaning that little or no manuring is necessary.’
Second, the nut draws on nutrients that are located higher in the soil than
cassava or millet, making intercropping recommendable.

This meant that any one, no matter how small his
farm, could produce groundnuts to supplement his income. Third, the nuts could
be picked early and stashed to await the availability of labour if priority was
given to food crops. At last, they could act as a substitute food crop in times
of hardship. In the end of course, peanuts paid a lot more than cotton in
return for the farmers’ investments of labour and capital.

Currently
conducting research in Kano, Olivier is finishing an MA in History at the
University of Liverpool.