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In the 80s and
early 90s, authoritarianism and militarism in West Africa led to
serious political crisis and civil war. The restoration of democracy in
the region in the 90s, however, led to a reduction of tensions and the
return of political stability. The tide seems to be changing over the
past decade as the restoration of electoral democracy is today
generating or reviving structural tensions and political instability in
the region.

One element of the
return to democracy crisis is the re-emergence of the old habit of
authoritarian ruling incumbents or their families simply refusing to
leave power as and when due. When Gnasingbe Eyadema of Togo died in
2005, his son simply took over in total disregard of the Constitution
and it took enormous pressure and threats by ECOWAS under the
leadership of Olusegun Obasanjo and Mamdou Tandja to force him to step
down and organise elections.

Mr Obasanjo himself
nearly precipitated a major political crisis in Nigeria in 2006 when he
tried to change the Constitution so that he would not have to step down
after his two terms in office. In Niger, President Tandja refused to
step down in 2010 when he finished his two terms, precipitating a major
political upheaval, and was finally forcibly removed from office
through a coup d’état.

At the heart of the
rising tensions provoked by elections is the unwillingness of ruling
cabals to cede power democratically. This is best expressed by the
12-year-old crisis in Cote d’Ivoire. In December 1999, Robert Guei
carried out a coup because he was afraid that Muslim northerners would
win the elections programmed to hold in 2000. The greatest danger to
Cote d’Ivoire, he argued, was that Alassane Outtara might win the
elections, so he banned him from the contest and declared that he would
run as military head of state.

General Guei
organised the 2000 elections without Outtara and to his shock
discovered that it was Laurent Gbagbo, not him, that was winning. He
tried to rig, it was too late; Gbagbo’s party, the FPI, were in the
streets protesting, and in the free-for-all riots, Guei was
assassinated and Gbagbo emerged as president. He took over Guei’s
policy that Muslims and northerners must never be allowed to rule in
Cote d’Ivoire. The result was civil war in 2002 when northern Muslims
in the country declared war and the country was split into two,
following the outbreak of hostilities. When Laurent Gbagbo’s term in
office ended in 2005, he too refused to organise elections on the same
grounds as General Guei — that Alassane Outtara might win. He delayed
the elections for five years, ruling without an electoral mandate until
he was forced to hold elections in 2010 through international pressure.

To confirm his
worst fears, Alassane Outtara did win the 2010 elections and he refused
to hand over power until war returned to the country and a combination
of troops from the northern patriotic forces, the French army and the
United Nations forces marched into Abidjan and arrested him in his
bunker. That process consumed thousands of innocent lives.

The surprising case
in which elections have not led to political crisis is Guinea. Guinea
never knew free and fair elections between 1958 and 2010. The 2010
elections in the country was a direct contest between the rich and
powerful Fulani elite under the leadership of Cellou Dalen who had been
excluded from power since 1958. The Fulani thought that 2010 was their
year; they gave 100 percent of their votes to Dalen who got 43 percent
in the first round, double the percentage of the second person. They
were confident; they needed less than 7 percent more in the second
round to win.

In the second round
however, all the minority ethnic groups ganged up to support the
historic opposition figure and Malinke power broker, Alpha Conde, who
won with 52 percent. The ethnic minorities felt the Fulani had economic
power and adding political power would make them too dominant. Rather
than complain about 50 years of oppression and marginalisation during
which about 50,000 Fulani leaders and cadres had been killed by the two
bloodthirsty dictators — Sekou Toure and Lansana Conte — Dalen, the
Fulani leader congratulated Alpha Conde for his victory and announced
that he would concentrate on preparing for the 2014 elections. Thanks
to his statesmanship, the transition was smooth.

The April 2011 Nigerian elections in which Goodluck Jonathan, a
southern minority Christian defeated a northern Muslim, Mohammadu
Buhari, led to riots and the massacre of hundreds of people,
reminiscent of the 1966 killings that led to the three-year civil war
in which one million people lost their lives. The return of very strong
ethno-religious and regional tensions related to electoral outcomes is
the most serious threat to West Africa’s political stability. We all
have a responsibility to promote political cohesion and avoid fanning
the embers of hate and division. We must be conscious that religious
insecurity is particularly insidious and dangerous because it makes
people feel threatened. Nigeria and indeed West Africa must remain
steadfast on the path of deepening democracy and maintaining peace.