A word about Jega’s register
I am an open source
software advocate. I was therefore very interested to learn that
Professor Attahiru Jega’s Direct Data Capture (DDC) machine – a fancy
name for a basic tools collection – is an open source database
programme, which runs on an Ubuntu Linux system configured on quite
ordinary PC hardware.
The System
Architect of INEC’s OpenVR, Nyimbi Odero, is a Kenyan who has lived and
worked in Nigeria for many years; all the other members of his
volunteer project team appear to be Nigerians. I know all this because
it was easy to find out. I simply asked a member of the registration
team to click on the About menu item on the registration screen to
enable me read its contents. Open source software philosophy permits me
to do so.
The database
contains the following fields: Surname, First Name, Other Names, Date
of Birth, an indication of whether the birth date given is approximate,
Gender, Address, Occupation, Phone Number, and national ID.
Additionally, a fingerprint reader used to capture prints from all ten
fingers, the results embedded into the database for each individual
record, as is a small-sized snapshot taken from the camera attached to
the PC.
I did not see that
the DDC setup contained any active network components, that is to say
what was recorded was not being transmitted to a central machine in a
remote location, nor did I see that it was equipped with a GPS device
to track the machine’s changes in physical location, or to record the
location of registration of each voter.
The first thing to
determine, when conducting a registration is the eligibility of the
intended registrant. I hadn’t heard or read that the Electoral
Commission had asked anyone to come to the registration centres with
proof of age.
It’s usually clear
to see whether a person is an adult or under aged, but it is not as
easy to tell that a woman is Kenyan and not Nigerian. I saw that
Professor Jega had taken care of the adult test; he will ask and trust
he will be supplied with the truth, hence the question about date of
birth.
I was disappointed
to see that Jega had made no attempt at all to ascertain the more
difficult question about nationality, and place of birth. There is the
National ID field in the database record, yes, but it doesn’t count
because a great many Nigerians have not been issued with one, and many
who have do not walk around with knowledge of its number. This failure
to properly determine eligibility opens the door for ineligible persons
to register.
Despite that lapse,
the process was simple and straightforward: A queue position-number
given; fingerprints and photograph taken; questions answered; a
registration slip containing a unique identifier and photo printed;
slip laminated and transformed into a voter’s card. And then,
curiously, card details entered into a very large Manual Voters
Register (MVR) along with the registrant’s thumbprint.
Considering how
simple the DDC hardware and software setup it seems a huge waste of
money that INEC opted to purchase laptops whereas the same results can
be achieved using much cheaper netbooks. The laptop in use was a Zinox,
made in Nigeria version, definitely brand new.
Above all I was on
the lookout for any clues that would indicate that a secure and trusted
electoral system has been put in place; one in which it is possible, in
the event of a dispute about election results, to verify them again and
again.
In the context of
our recent history, a trusted system should make the bizarre so-called
re-run elections unnecessary. The About screen contained the
reassuring, if sexist, slogan “One Man One Vote and One Vote Only” but
there was not much else to suggest that such a system is now in place.
The very useful Linux machines, which can aid such a process, appear
thus far to be seriously under-utilised.
I have wondered
given that the machines are not networked, what the fingerprint capture
aims to achieve. Perhaps fingerprint verification will be a preliminary
part of the voting process; that would be a good thing. It could also
be that the captured data will be consolidated post-registration so as
to detect multiple registrants, but considering that scores of
thousands of DDCs are involved, that is a less than optimal approach
likely to prove tricky.
The MVR also
suggests a disturbing lack of confidence in the technology. And as with
the last census where teams were sent out to gather data, I have also
wondered whether safeguards were put in place to ensure that all of the
captured data made it back to the Commission’s offices, and that
unauthorised copies were not made.
I do realise that
Jega has worked very hard and is under some serious time constraints.
Nonetheless, there is one thing I can urge him not to overlook. It’s
been reported that the voters register is to be posted on the
Commission’s website for verification. That will be helpful provided
that the information is only accessible via a query to the consolidated
database. To verify, one should simply enter his voter ID and the
system shall return his name and place of registration.
But INEC should be wary of placing such large-scale sensitive
information in the hands of our domestic criminals notorious for online
fraud, and unknown foreign enemies.
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