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When Fitch Ratings,
one of the world’s better-known Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs), was
reported in the papers last week as having downgraded its outlook on
the Nigerian economy, my initial reaction was “So what?” A negative
credit warning should increase the price of the country’s sovereign
risk. But how to measure this in the absence of a sovereign debt
instrument?

Besides, the credit
rating function is the most damaged franchise to have come out of the
recent global crisis. Indeed, after Greece nearly succumbed to the
market’s panic over the sustainability of its near-term fiscal outlook,
and the deluge of sovereign rating downgrades that followed the
European sovereign debt crisis, the big question has been over the
accuracy of the CRAs’ credit risk assessments.

One of the most
important recent contributions to the debate over the continued
relevance of credit ratings, the IMF’s Global Financial Stability
Report (GFSR) for October 2010, finds the key strength of the CRAs in
their ability to “provide information, monitoring, and certification
services.”

This way, the CRAs
even out the information asymmetries between debt issuers and
investors, provide (through their rating downgrades) continuous
assessments of these securities, and because most countries insist on
credit ratings as part of most financial contracts, they also provide
an assurance function.

Consequently,
countries cannot readily and cheaply “access global capital markets and
attract foreign investment”, if they have not been rated first. Few
investors will touch fixed-income securities that do not have credit
ratings.

And it would seem
that the originate-to-distribute model of bank lending (which replaced
the traditional originate-and-hold variety, and which has been
described as complicit in the underestimation of risk that aggravated
the current financial crisis) could not have happened if the CRAs did
not start lending their imprimaturs to structured products.

Did these functions
also destabilise financial markets? How much of the impact of the
sovereign debt crisis in Europe was because holders of some countries
debt instruments felt pressured by adverse credit rating news in other
countries to demand stricter repayment covenants?

The IMF concludes
that “CRAs do have an impact on the funding costs of issuers and
consequently their actions can be a financial stability issue.”
Accordingly, the GFSR October 2010 recommends, amongst others, for
policy-makers to redouble efforts at reducing “their own reliance on
credit ratings, and wherever possible (removing) or (replacing)
references to ratings in laws and regulations, and in central bank
collateral policies.”

The Fund also
counselled regulators to strengthen their supervision of CRAs if they
had to use the latter’s ratings for their regulations.

Significantly, the
Fund also found that the informational value of sovereign ratings
occurs not through “actual rating changes,” but because of “outlooks”,
“reviews” and “watches”, which show the possible future trajectory “and
timing of future rating actions.”

On this count, the
response of the Nigerian authorities to Fitch’s review was risible.
Splitting hairs over whether this was a rating or an outlook downgrade
doesn’t quite make the grade. The point is that according to the IMF,
“CRAs use a negative ‘outlook’ notification to indicate the potential
for a downgrade within the next two years (one year in the case of
speculative-grade credits)”. And that between June 26, 1989 and March
31, 2010, the 212 negative outlooks published by one of the leading
CRAs were followed by 118 downgrades within an average of six months.

So, the possibility
of a rating downgrade is high, if over the near-term, government fails
to address the public expenditure management framework in a way that
significantly assuages public concerns.

For, it is not only
the rating agencies that are concerned at the rapid decline of the
country’s foreign reserves, even as demand pressure continues to mount
in the foreign exchange markets; or the country’s rising external debt,
in the face of constricting domestic capacity use. Government may be
persuaded of the usefulness of its planned reforms: proposed
establishment of a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF); and its intent to
address the infrastructure deficit in the power sector.

The truth, though,
is a wee bit different: in the absence of sustained and identifiable
welfare gains from government’s sundry activities, the electorate does
not care (nor can it subsist) on the ideas (for reform) that reside in
their leaders’ heads.